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Survivor Bonds and Compulsory
Annuitization: Reducing the Costs of
Pension Provision
David Blake, William Burrows, and J. Michael
Orszag
Governments throughout the world are examining how their pension pro-
grams might be improved for those who are poorly served by existing sys-
tems. Most attention to date has focused on the accumulation stage, or the
period of active membership in a pension scheme until retirement. Issues
here include the advantages and disadvantages of funding versus pay-as-you-
go (PAYG), defined benefit versus defined contribution, and active versus
passive fund management.∞ What has received much less attention is pen-
sion performance at the retirement stage. This lack of focus on retirement
issues is not surprising, since when a new system is established, the retire-
ment phase is typically ∂≠ years or more ahead. Furthermore, for members
of defined benefit schemes (whether public or private sector, funded or
unfunded), someone other than the scheme member is guaranteeing or at
least promising to deliver a particular level of pension in retirement. How-
ever, this is not the case with defined contribution plans, and most new
pensions being established throughout the world are DC schemes.
With many DC schemes, there is no guaranteed pension at retirement.
Rather, the retiree must live on whatever fund value has been accumulated
at the time of retirement. In addition, because of uncertain life expectancy,
individuals also face the risk of outliving their resources. They can insure
against the risk of living too long by buying a life annuity from an insurance
company, although the purchase of an annuity is not compulsory in many
countries (e.g., the United States, Australia, and Germany). But two prob-
lems may arise with this arrangement:
∞) Mortality risk. Mortality has improved substantially over the last century,
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but it is very difficult to forecast improvements in mortality accurately. This
is what is meant by mortality risk. Under a state-run unfounded system, the
government bears this mortality risk directly. While governments or large
occupational schemes may have the ability to adjust contribution rates to
bear such a risk, it is quite another thing for insurance companies to take
this on. Of special concern is the role of new insurers being established in a
country with no previous history of annuity provision. Because lifetimes are
uncertain, insurers must construct hedged investment portfolios consisting
of many types of long-term bonds; however, such portfolios may be costly
to manage and, in any case, often provide imperfect hedges against mortal-
ity risk.
≤) Adverse selection. Those who expect to live the longest will tend to have
the highest demand for annuities. In such circumstances, if people are given
choice about whether or when to purchase an annuity asset yields will have
to be lower than actuarially fair for the population as a whole to compensate
for the fact that the buyers of annuities are likely to experience lighter
mortality (Brown et al., this volume). In other words, there is adverse selection
in the demand for annuities and, to compensate, the providers of annuities
need to lower the annuity yields they offer (the amount by which the an-
nuity yield falls is known as the adverse selection bias). With defined benefit
schemes in the UK, this choice is limited or even nonexistent. However,
DC arrangements in the UK permit a wide range of choice over both the
amount and timing of the annuity purchase. The pension can currently be
provided in one of four ways: a life annuity purchased from a life assurance
company, a life annuity provided by the scheme itself in the case of occupa-
tional DC schemes, a phased life annuity, or an income drawdown facility.≤
Members of personal pension and group personal pension schemes≥ are
required to purchase annuities from life companies before they reach the
age of π∑, but they are currently not obliged to buy annuities on the date
they retire (which can be from age ∑≠ upwards).
This analysis investigates how these two problems can be minimized. We
believe that only compulsory pension annuities from a mandatory funded
pension system can help resolve the problem of adverse selection. Further,
the age of purchase must coincide with the retirement date. But such annui-
ties only cope with the second problem while they do nothing about the first.
To address the first problem, we propose that the government help current
and future retirees by providing insurance against aggregate or cohort mor-
tality risk. To do so, we show how a government can issue a new type of bond, a
survivor (or indexed life), bond, one that allows its holders to hedge aggregate
mortality risk and so reduce the management charges associated with con-
structing a hedged investment portfolio. We expect that there would be a
strong demand for the new bond from insurance companies, mature pen-
sion funds, and occupational money purchase or ∂≠∞(k)-type schemes.
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Mortality Risk
Consider an individual who will live for exactly T additional years. This
individual could use a lump sum to purchase an annuity from an insurance
company, or to buy an annuity bond (which pays coupons only and has no
principal repayment) directly from the financial markets. Both products will
yield a constant income stream for T years. In the absence of arbitrage, both





∞ – (∞ + r)–T  ,(∞)
where d is the annual coupon and r is the relevant discount rate (as a
proportion). If someone purchased this bond at price P and then lived
exactly T years, this would be equivalent to someone purchasing a T-year
annuity for an amount P which paid d per year in arrears.
In reality, neither individuals nor insurance companies know exactly how
long any individual annuitant will live. In the case of an annuity bond which
continues to pay out coupons for as long as the individual is alive, its price
depends on the whole probability distribution of death rates for this individ-
ual. In other words, T is a random variable, and not a fixed parameter. As a
consequence, the market price of such annuity bonds depends on expecta-
tions about the random variable T as follows:
P = E  d
r
∞ – (∞ + r)–T  ,(≤)
where E is the expectations operator.
Annuity bonds with random maturities are currently not available on
financial markets, but insurance companies do provide life annuities with
uncertain T. Each insurance company would be expected to attempt to
minimize its exposure to mortality risk by holding a portfolio of fixed-term
bonds that matched the anticipated mortality profile of its annuitants, and
by building up a large enough pool of annuitants to minimize the risk of
lighter than expected mortality. Nevertheless, an insurance company can-
not predict mortality perfectly. To consider the effects of errors in forecast-
ing mortality improvements, we denote the probability of dying at age x
having survived to age x – l by qx. Suppose that the insurance company
forecasts mortality improvements by adjusting data from an actuarial table
qxO by multiplying by an exponential factor f x– x≠, where x≠ is the current age
of the annuitant and f  is a scalar (which is less than unity if mortality
improves over time and equal to unity in the case of no mortality improve-
ment). This is one way in which the United Kingdom Institute of Actuaries
Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau (CMIB) makes mortality adjust-
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ments. In terms of the qx, the unconditional probability of dying after T ] ≠
periods (conditional on having lived to age xo) is
qT+ x ≠
x ≠+T– ∞	
x = x ≠
(∞ – qx ) ,
where qx is the conditional probability of dying at age x having survived to
age x–l. This unconditional probability is used in computing the expected







 ∞ – (∞ + r)–T   qT≠+ x≠ f T x ≠+T– ∞	
x = x ≠
(∞ – qx≠f x– x ≠ ) .(≥)
Errors in the adjustment factor f  can have a large impact on equation (≥).
Historical evidence on mortality forecasts in the UK suggest that forecast
errors of ∞∑–≤≠ percent in f  for intervals of ∞≠ or more years ahead are not
uncommon (MacDonald ∞ΩΩ∏). Another indicator of the difficulty in fore-
casting mortality improvements is that historical values of these improve-
ment factors are not constants: they differ considerably for men and women,
different ages, and different types of pensioners. For instance, the historical
improvement rate for men aged π≠ between ∞Ω∏π–π≠ and ∞ΩπΩ–∫≤ was ≠.π∂
for life office pensioners and ≠.Ω∞ for immediate annuitants, i.e., those who
purchase annuities voluntarily (MacDonald, ∞ΩΩ∏). The impact of such fore-
cast errors on survival probabilities is significant. For example, assume a ≤≠-
year improvement factor of ≠.∫≠ for a ∏∑-year old man and forecast errors
for mortality rates of up to ∞≠ percent over a ∞≠-year period. Using the
PMA∫≠ mortality tables (constructed to reflect the mortality experiences of
males who purchase pension annuities), the forecast probability of a ∏∑-year
old man living to ∫∑ ranges between ≥≥.π and ∂≥.∫ per cent, while that of
him living to Ω∑ ranges between ∑.≥ and ∞∑.≥ per cent.∏
To determine the effects of these forecast errors on annuity yields, we use





E  (∞ – (∞ + r)–T )/r  .(∂)
To compute the actuarially fair yield (i.e., one with a zero cost loading), we
substitute in survival probabilities determined from standard actuarial ta-
bles into Eq. (∂). For a male aged ∏∑, using a discount rate r of π percent,
and a ≤≠-year improvement factor f  of ≠.∫≠, the PMA∫≠ tables lead to an
actuarially fair annuity yield of ∞≠.∏ percent, but forecast errors suggest it
lies between ∞≠.≥ and ∞≠.Ω percent. Thus the percentage difference in yields
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is about ∑ percent.π For a woman, the PFA∫≠ tables lead to an actuarially fair
yield of Ω.∑ percent in the absence of mortality risk, but forecast errors
suggest it lies between Ω.≤ and Ω.π percent, again a percentage difference of
about ∑ percent.
The effects of mortality forecast errors are more serious for escalating
annuities, because payments in the future will be higher than with flat an-
nuities. For escalating annuities, Eq. (∂) becomes:
d
P
= ∞ / E (∞ + p)  ∞ + (∞ + p)/(∞ + r)T
r – p
 .(∑)
where p is the uprating factor. For example, with an annuity escalating at ∂
percent per annum, the percentage difference between upper and lower
forecast bounds∫ rises considerably, to Ω.∑ percent for women and to ∫.Ω
percent for men.
Given the significance of mortality forecasts for insurance company prof-
itability, it is not surprising that cost loadings to cover mortality risk are built
into prices. Further, some insurers may simply offer uncompetitive annuity
rates, thereby effectively staying out of the market. Insurance companies
cannot at present reduce these loadings without taking on unreasonable
risks; indeed, anecdotal evidence for the UK indicates that the failure of
some insurance companies accurately to predict improvements in mortality
has led to serious problems among suppliers of deferred annuities, which
are even more susceptible to mortality risk than immediate annuities.Ω Simi-
lar calculations for a ≤≠-year deferred annuity escalating at ∂ percent per
annum to be received by a woman when she reaches the age of ∏∑ suggest a
range of about ≤≤ percent in annuity yields under different mortality fore-
casts. These business considerations may explain why the market for de-
ferred annuities in the United Kingdom is relatively thin.∞≠ Deferred annu-
ities are particularly important in the case where a defined benefit scheme is
wound up, say, as a result of the insolvency of the sponsoring company and
also, potentially, for early leavers.
Because the private sector may be less able to absorb the aggregate risks
associated with mortality forecast errors than the government, we next eval-
uate what a government might do to help alleviate this problem and reduce
costs to annuitants. First, however, we review another factor which can re-
duce the value of DC pensions.
Adverse Selection
A second problem which contributes to the cost of annuities is adverse
selection: people who purchase annuities tend to live longer than the popu-
lation as a whole. This issue may be illustrated in the UK context by compar-
ing annuities priced using the English Life Tables (ELT∞∂), which reflects
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the mortality experiences of the population as a whole, with those priced
using PMA∫≠ and PFA∫≠, which reflect the mortality experiences of, respec-
tively, male and female pension annuitants.∞∞ No life insurance company
would be prepared to offer an annuity yield based on ELT∞∂. People who
want to purchase annuities have private information (say, from their own
family history and health experience) that they will likely have higher than
average life expectancies. The insurers are thus subject to an adverse selec-
tion problem in that demanders of annuities do not reflect the statistical
experience of the population as a whole.
How much does adverse selection contribute to the cost loadings for
annuities in the U.K? Using equation (∂) with r set at ∫ percent and no
future mortality improvements, the PMA∫≠/PFA∫≠ tables (downrated two
years)∞≤ suggest annuity yields (annual in arrears) of ∞∞.≤ percent for a ∏∑-
year-old man, and ∞≠.≤ percent for a ∏∑-year-old woman. ELT∞∂ (downrated
two years) suggests much higher annuity yields: ∞≤.Ω percent for a ∏∑-year-
old man, and ∞∞.≤ percent for a ∏∑-year-old woman. This adverse selection
bias increases with age: ELT∞∂ suggests that a π∑-year-old man purchasing an
annuity should receive an actuarially fair rate of ∞π.∑ percent, whereas
PMA∫≠ suggests a rate of just ∞∂.∏ percent.
Consider the case of two identical ∏∑-year-old males: one retires with a
state PAYG pension of £≤≠ per week, and the second retires with a DC
pension and purchases an annuity from an insurance company. Suppose for
simplicity that all insurance companies are nonprofit organizations and that
there is no mortality risk, so that actual experience corresponds exactly with
PMA∫≠ (downrated two years). If the second retiree were typical of the
population as a whole (i.e., ELT∞∂), he should receive an annuity with a
∞≤.Ω percent yield. Suppose this also results in a pension of £≤≠ per week.
But the insurance company will only offer an annuity yield of ∞∞.≤ percent
or £∞π.≥∏ per week, a reduction of close to ∞∑ percent. Administrative cost
loadings and adjustments to cover mortality risk will result in an even lower
pension.∞≥
The second ∏∑-year-old may even be worse off than indicated, because
state PAYG schemes usually provide indexed or inflation linked pensions.
For escalating annuities, the adverse selection problem is more severe be-
cause there is a greater gain from living longer. PMA∫≠ suggests that a ∂
percent escalating annuity should offer a yield of ∫.≤∂ percent, whereas
ELT∞∂ suggests Ω.Ω≥ percent, which implies a pension reduction of nearly
≤≠ percent.
Unlike the costs analyzed in the previous section associated with mortality
risk, adverse selection costs depend on the choices exercised by purchasers
of insurance. The introduction of a lump sum option (known in the U.K. as
an income drawdown), while increasing choice, also leads to yet larger
adverse selection problems and thus higher costs for annuities for those who
might need them most.
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A Possible Solution: Survivor Bonds and Compulsory
Annuitization
When insurance companies write annuities, they often use premiums col-
lected to buy matching assets, that is, assets whose cash payments match as
closely as possible the anticipated pattern of payouts on the liabilities that
they face. In the case of level annuities, insurers invest principally in fixed-
income bonds. In the case of index-linked annuities, insurers may hold
index-linked bonds: insurers would not be prepared to write index-linked
annuities if they could not lay off the resulting inflation risk through the
purchase of an index-linked bond (issued by the government or a utility).
However, insurance companies face two risks for which there are no existing
matching assets: mortality risk and adverse selection, as already discussed.
A potential simple solution to the problem of mortality risk would be for
the government to issue survivor (or life-indexed) bonds. These would be
bonds whose future coupon payments depend on the percentage of the
population of retirement age (say ∏∑) at the date of issue still alive at future
coupon payment dates. For a bond issued in ≤≠≠≠, for example, the coupon
in ≤≠≤≠ will be proportional to the fraction of ∏∑-year-olds in the population
who have lived to age ∫∑. The coupon is therefore directly proportional to
the amount an insurance company needs to pay out as an annuity to the
average individual with an average pension. Large employer or occupa-
tional schemes that also bear aggregate mortality risk could similarly be
purchasers of such bonds.
Survivor bonds aim to lower the costs of retirement provision for the
average pensioner, because they help to hedge aggregate mortality risk. How-
ever, they cannot hedge specific mortality risks. There are two key specific
risks to take into account: (∞) pensioner annuitants are a select group who
are likely to live longer than the average of the population of the same age,
and (≤) given that an insurance company is underwriting a finite sample of
lives, the characteristics of any particular insurance company’s pool of an-
nuitants may differ from that of the pensioner annuitant population as a
whole. For example, women and wealthy pensioner annuitants with large
lump sums to annuitize tend to live longer than the average pensioner
annuitant. The bonds we describe here can only eliminate the risk associ-
ated with aggregate mortality improvements for the entire population, but
they do not eliminate idiosyncratic risks such as those associated with wealth
or other select effects.
In short, by minimizing aggregate risk, insurance companies would have
the proper incentives to develop wide mortality pools and do what they do
best: provide insurance against idiosyncratic risks. For instance, if the mor-
tality of the rich improved more than that of the poor and the insurance
company chose an equally weighted pool of rich and poor, the payouts by
the insurance company would decline less rapidly than the coupon pay-
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ments from the survivor bonds. The rate at which this happens depends on
the differences between terms in
qT≠+ x≠ f T
x ≠+T– ∞	
x = x ≠
(∞ – qx≠ f x – x ≠ )
for the insurance company’s own annuitant pool, versus those for the popu-
lation as a whole. The q ’s and f ’s will be lower for the insurance company’s
annuitant pool and the forecast errors higher than for the population as a
whole. The implication of this is that insurance companies that have mor-
tality pools different from the population at large continue to bear specific
mortality risk. Of course this is a commercial decision, and insurance com-
panies should be expected to charge a residual load based on these differ-
ences to cover them.
An important point to recognize is that there are no obvious matching
assets for the select mortality risks assumed by annuity providers, once they
hold survivor bonds to hedge aggregate mortality risk. The provider will
hedge these select risks by offering lower annuity rates to all annuitants. This
disadvantages the average annuitants who are not members of the select
groups. One way of dealing with this problem is to reduce the select mor-
tality risks to zero by making pension plans and pension annuities manda-
tory for all members of society.∞∂
The issue price of survivor bonds would be determined by a central body
such as the Government Actuary in the UK. We do not envisage any major
problems with determining the issue price: the government could publish
its underlying assumptions concerning mortality. It is likely that the risk of
underestimating mortality improvements is a smaller risk than that of un-
derestimating future inflation, and there appears to be no problem with
determining the issue price of retail price index-linked bonds in the UK or
the U.S. Thereafter, the government would have to produce a monthly
mortality index just as it produces a monthly retail price index. These bonds
could be traded on the open market and could be resold with the second-
ary market prices indicating the market’s expectations concerning future
mortality.
Why should governments (and ultimately taxpayers) issue survivor bonds
and absorb the risks associated with mortality fluctuations? A possible justifi-
cation can be found in the Arrow-Lind Theorem (∞Ωπ≠) on social risk-
bearing, which shows that by dispersing an aggregate risk across the popula-
tion (of taxpayers) as a whole, the associated risk premium can be reduced
to zero. A government might then issue survivor bonds at a lower yield
(namely, the risk-free rate) than could any private corporation. A private
company would have much fewer shareholders than there are taxpayers,
and some of the shareholders might hold large blocks of shares which would
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constitute a significant proportion of their net worth. These shareholders
would demand a risk premium, whereas the government can act as a risk-
neutral player. Another potential justification lies in the government’s own
public health campaigns, which are aimed directly at reducing mortality in
the entire population; this has important implications for annuity provision
by the private sector. Similarly, the reform of Social Security and the transfer
of pension provision from the public to the private sector would be greatly
eased by the existence of survivor bonds.∞∑
By issuing survivor bonds, a government could help to complete markets.
But why has the private sector not issued survivor bonds? One apparent
natural class of issuer is insurance companies themselves, since they are in a
position to hedge mortality risk with their other products: greater longevity
raises the payouts on annuities but lowers them on endowment or life insur-
ance policies. But in practice, endowment or life insurance policies provide
a poor hedge for annuities, since mortality improvements are not spread
evenly across ages, but rather are concentrated at older ages. To illustrate,
the percentage improvement in mortality between the PMA∫≠ and PAΩ≠M
tables (based on mortality experience for United Kingdom male annuitants
in ∞Ω∫≠ and ∞ΩΩ≠ respectively) was ∞≤ percent at age ≥∑, Ω percent at age ∑∑,
≤≥ percent at age π∑ and ≤≠ percent at age Ω∑. The family itself also provides
an informal mechanism for the issuing survivor bonds between different
generations of the same family, as implied by Kotlikoff and Spivak (∞Ω∫∞),
but the breakdown of the family in many countries makes this an increas-
ingly unreliable mechanism. So we may be left with the state as the only
realistic issuer of survivor bonds.
Conclusion
Some governments have helped pension funds insure against inflation by
issuing index-linked bonds in the UK and more recently in the United
States. We contend that the issuance of survivor bonds would help mature
pension funds insure against the uncertainties involving an increasingly
aging population. The reduction in cost loadings on annuities could be
significant, and might be further reduced by eliminating the select effects
associated with the voluntary purchase of annuities and requiring the man-
datory annuitization of pension funds on retirement.
Appendix: A Brief Overview of the UK Annuities Market
Although annuities have been available in the United Kingdom for several
centuries, the market for annuities did not develop until after the adoption
of self-employed pensions (the precursor to personal pensions) in the ∞Ω∑≠s.
These policies, known as Section ≤≤∏ retirement annuities, stipulated that at
retirement a tax-free cash sum could be paid and the remaining balance had
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to be used to purchase an annuity from an authorized insurance company.
The legislation provided for an open market option which allowed the
policyholder to purchase an annuity from another insurance company. This
was the beginning of the competitive market in UK annuities.
The calculation of annuity yields is based primarily on: (∞) mortality
tables, (≤) prevailing long term interest rates, (≥) the insurance company’s
balance sheet and capital requirements, (∂) the insurance company’s tax
position, and (∑) the insurance company’s corporate strategy. For example,
one major insurer (Legal & General) has recently repriced its annuities,
favoring smaller annuities; such a strategy helps develop a wide pool of
annuitants and minimizes the adverse selection problems discussed above.
In general, large annuities are offered at more favorable rates, which bene-
fits the wealthier investor at the expense of those who have smaller pension
policies. The reason for this is the relatively high cost associated with admin-
istering each new policy.
Annuity yields have been falling since ∞ΩΩ≠ in the UK; by ≤≠≠≠, they had
fallen by over ≥≠ percent. This trend is set to continue as longer term
interest rates fall and companies readjust their mortality tables to take into
account longer life expectancy. The government responded to the reduc-
tion in annuity yields by introducing income drawdown with the Finance
Act of ∞ΩΩ∑. Income drawdown allows individuals with personal pensions to
defer annuity purchase until age π∑ and in the meantime invest in higher
yielding assets. Income drawdown plans typically have reasonably high
charges and hence are only economical for the relatively well-off.
The difference between the best and worst annuity yields can be as much
as ∑≠ percent over all the companies offering annuities; even across the top
∞≠ providers, the difference can be substantial. These price differentials
between suppliers are quite surprising, given there is almost no variation in
the type of policy offered. There is a distinct absence of competition outside
the few companies which compete at the very top of the annuity yield tables.
Most companies make an active decision to offer unattractive annuity yields,
thereby effectively staying out of the market. This leaves only a handful of
companies in the UK now prepared to write new annuity business. Although
companies wanting to attract new business will want to offer the best annuity
yields, there must invariably come a point when some of these companies
will either have written their quota or make a commercial decision to con-
centrate on other types of business which are subject to smaller long-term
risks.
There was very little innovation in the standard annuity policy at first and,
although companies such as Commercial Union, M&G, and the then Provi-
dent Mutual offered investment-linked annuities, these were restricted to
their own policyholders. It was not until ∞Ω∫π that Equitable Life launched a
range of with-profit annuities and unit-linked annuities that were available
to all retiring pensioners through the open market option. The other im-
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portant recent developments in the annuity market included the intro-
duction of inflation-linked annuities and impaired life annuities (see also
Finkelstein and Poterba ∞ΩΩΩ).
Notes
We thank Angus MacDonald, Olivia S. Mitchell, Tim Sheldon, Guy Thomas, and
Steve Zeldes for very useful insights and comments. Opinions are solely those of the
authors.
∞. For a review of issues involved in the debate in the United Kingdom see Blake
and Orszag (∞ΩΩπ, ∞ΩΩ∫), and Finkelstein and Poterba (∞ΩΩΩ).
≤. Income drawdown is also known as income withdrawal, pension fund with-
drawal, or drawdown, cash withdrawal or capital withdrawal. For more details, see the
Appendix.
≥. These are broadly comparable with individual retirement accounts and ∂≠∞(k)
plans in the United States, respectively.
∂. We assume for simplicity a flat yield curve.




 d(∞+ r)–T  x≠+T– ∞
x = x ≠
(∞ – qx≠ f x – x≠ ) .
∏. The quoted improvement factors are in units of ≤≠ years and need to be con-
verted to one-year factors. This is done in our case as follows. For a ≤≠-year improve-
ment factor of ≠.∫, the one-year improvement factor is ≠.∫∞/≤≠. The lower bound on
the improvement factor is the one-year improvement factor times ≠.Ω≠∞/∞≠, while the
upper bound is the one-year improvement factor times ∞.∞≠∞/∞≠; this converts a ∞≠
percent forecast error either way over ∞≠ years to the appropriate one-year forecast
error.
π. Computed as (∞≠.Ω – ∞≠.≥) / ∞≠.∏.
∫. We use the term ‘‘bound’’ to represent outcomes with typical historical forecast
errors.
Ω. Currently, life companies are having to make annuity payments for two years
longer than originally anticipated, according to UK industry information.
∞≠. Only £∞≠ million in single premium deferred annuities were issued in ∞ΩΩ∏,
about one-eightieth of the level of single premium immediate annuities sold that
year (Association of British Insurers ∞ΩΩπ).
∞∞. PMA∫≠/PFA∫≠ reflects the mortality experiences of pension annuitants sub-
ject to some degree of compulsion on annuity purchase. Adverse selection arises
here as a result of: (∞) commutation into lump sums, (≤) choice of retirement date,
(≥) fund size at retirement, and (∂) income drawdown election, all of which depend
on individuals’ private information. The IM∫≠/IF∫≠ tables, in contrast, reflect the
mortality experiences of immediate annuitants who willingly purchase annuities; we
have chosen instead to focus on the problem as experienced by typical pensioners.
∞≤. This reflects mortality improvements since the PMA∫≠ tables were constructed.
∞≥. The United Kingdom Government Actuary’s Department allows for a cost
loading of ≤ percent for the annuity purchase in its calculations for DC occupational
schemes contracting out of the second state pension (SERPS).
∞∂. There is an alternative way of dealing with the problem, namely for the govern-
ment to select the population of pensioner annuitants as ‘‘the population’’ for which
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it issues survivor bonds, but it is highly unlikely that any government would agree to
do this, on the grounds that it may represent a substantial subsidy to the better-off
members of society.
∞∑. The risk associated with unexpected cohort longevity will likely be correlated
with the tax burden of paying off this now more-costly survivor bond, and if older
persons shoulder some of this risk, the Arrow-Lind theorem would be violated.
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